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Editor. Accidents 
1. Trapped by/in moving material 
A  labourer,  working  inside  a  mineral  bunker,  sus-
tained  minor injuries after being  trapped  up  to the 
waist in mineral pellets. 
The accident occurred inside a mineral bunker, one of 
25 in the Merchant Iron Plant. They contain materials 
prior to weighing  and  charging to furnace skips by 
scale car. At the time, certain bunkers were being emp-
tied of ferrous materials. The standard procedure was 
that the bunkers were drawn off by the scale car until 
the material inside the bunker was at such a level that 
it would not flow freely from the bunker ports. At this 
stage a layer of residual material would be left on the 
inclined back of the bunker.  It would then be  neces-
sary for men to enter the bunker in order to complete 
the emptying process. 
Three men had been  detailed to clear residual mate-
rial  from  one  of the  bunkers  in  furtherance  of  the 
operation already described. 
A shift manager, checking the progress of the work, 
found that one of the men  was trapped by  his lower 
legs in pellets. He was not wearing a safety harness 
as required by the Safe Working Procedure. 
The shift manager instructed the two other men to se-
cure a safety belt to the man who was trapped and to 
fasten  it to the back of a conveyor structure. He  ra-
dioed the scale car driver engaged in this changeover 
operation and instructed him not to draw any further 
material  from  the bunker.  He  then  went  to join the 
scale car driver in order to supervise the careful and 
controlled withdrawal of some pellets from the bun-
ker. After this had been done he told the scale car driv-
er not to withdraw any more material until instructed 
to do so. The shift manager then returned to the bun-
ker where he  found that more pellets had been with-
drawn from the bunker on the instructions of the two 
men there so that the trapped man was now buried up 
to  his waist. The  shift manager then  made arrange-
ments to have corrugated sheets positioned around 
the trapped man in order to keep the pellets back. He 
also summoned assistance from shift tacklemen and 
the Medical Centre. 
When the medical personnel arrived at the site they in-
structed the scale car driver to withdraw more pellets 
with the result that the man became buried up to his 
ribs. A second line attached to a harness was secured 
to the trapped man and, with the tackleman holding 
him on a vertical line, he was pulled clear of the pel-
lefs by the line running down the back of the bunker. 
He was examined by medical personnel in this posi-
tion and, after determining that he had no serious in-
juries he was pulled up the back of the bunker and tak-
en into a conveyor housing. 
After considering the aforementioned facts,  a Panel 
of Enquiry concluded that the accident had occurred 
because the correct procedure for cleaning bunkers 
had not been implemented. Additionally, a contribute-
. ry factor had been the scale car driver's failure to obey 
the instructions of the shift manager. 
Recommendations 
1. The 'Procedure for cleaning ore bunkers at the mer-
chant iron plant' as follows, to be  re-issued  to all 
men engaged on the job and all staff: 
Procedure 
The day foreman/shift manager will: 
(i)  Inform the scale car driver at the particular fur-
nace that men will be working inside the parti-
cular bunker. 
(ii)  Ensure that warning notice boards are affixed 
over the bunker bin gates, 'Danger men  work-
ing in bunker'. 
(iii)  Instruct the scale car driver only to draw mate-
rial from that bunker when instructed by the ob-
server  appointed to watch  the cleaning  oper-
ation. 
(iv)  Instruct the gantry tippers that men  are work-
ing inside the particular bunker and that noma-
terial must be tipped in this bunker. 
(v)  Instruct the coke beltman that the tipper car-
riage must not be  moved  across the back of 
that bunker. 
(vi)  Ensure that the openings at the top of the bun-
ker are sheeted over with corrugated sheeting. 
(vii)  Ensure that an observer is stationed at the bun-
ker top to observe the men during the cleaning 
operation and to pass messages to the scale 
car driver to draw material as requested by the 
men working in the bunker. 
(viii) Ensure  that  no  more  than  three  men  are  al-
lowed to work inside the bunker at a given time. 
(ix)  Ensure that entry at the back of the bunker is 
by means of a sound wooden ladder which has 
been lashed to the superstructure. 
(x)  Ensure that all  men  entering the bunker wear 
helmet and goggles and are fitted with a safety 
harness  and  lifeline which  is secured  to the 
handrail at the back of the bunker. 
(xi)  Ensure that all safety harnesses and  lifelines 
are  returned  to the store for inspection after 
the teaming operation. 
2. Staff to ensure all men work to procedure when en-
gaged on this job. 
3. Refresher teach-ins related to Safety Working Pro-
cedures and aspects of the Health & Safety at Work 
Act to be arranged. 
2. Machinery struck by moving object 
A crane driver sustained serious head  injuries after 
being struck by a piece of scrap wood which was be-
ing broken up in an  unorthodox manner, with the aid 
of pneumatically operated tube handling machinery. 
The accident occurred in a finishing area of the tube 
making  process.  Tubes  are  rolled  manually  on  to 
pneumatically operated  arms  whilst they are  in  the 
'up' position, and these are then lowered to allow the 
tube to come to rest on  the Weighs Rack in order to 
obtain the weight. After weighing, tubes are lifted by 
another set of pneumatically operated arms and depos-
ited on  a Stencil  Rack where details concerning de-
1 spatch etc. are  applied. During a break in  legitimate 
production activities on  the day of the accident the 
throw-over arms were being used in an  unauthorized 
and potentially dangerous manner,  in  order to break 
scrap wood for use in a brazier type fire which was be-
ing  used to provide heat  in  the are.  Because of the 
break a group of men were in the area. Whilst section 
wood measuring 3" x 3", approximately 5'0" in length, 
was being broken up in the aforementioned manner, a 
piece approximately 2'0" long was ejected from the 
arm, it struck the concrete floor of the bay,  ricochet-
ted and struck a crane driver, who was standing talk-
ing to a workmate, approximately 20'0" from  the in-
stallation.  It  hit him  on  the  right  side  of his  face, 
knocking  him  backwards  on  to the  floor where  he 
struck  the  back  of  his  head.  He  sustained  facial 
lacerations, a fractured skull and injury to his left eye. 
The  accident occurred during a  period  of extremely 
cold weather. On  the previous night the doors to the 
bay had been  damaged in a storm and could not be 
closed.  Propane gas heaters were normally used for 
space heating in the area. Fresh cylinders of propane 
gas  were  only issued  from  the  stores  when  empty 
ones  were  returned.  On  occasions  when  supplies 
were limited areas closest to the point of issue used 
up  available supplies on  a  'first come,  first served' 
basis. During investigations, it was established that it 
was not uncommon for a brazier to be used when pro-
pane fuel heating was not available, and even on oc-
casion, in preference to propane heating. It was also 
established that it was not uncommon to break wood 
using the throw-over arms at the weighing machines. 
Before making recommendations the Panel of Enquiry 
investigating the circumstances surrounding this ac-
cident, concluded that: 
(i) Breaking wood in the manner described meant that 
equipment was being used for a purpose other than 
that for which it had been designed. Action taken 
on the misuse of plant and machinery might have 
prevented the accident. 
(il) It was the responsibility of local management to 
ensure that there was an effective system for heat-
ing workplaces. If this system was to be  bottled-
gas fired,  then  adequate supplies of bottled gas 
should be available at all times. 
Recommendations 
1. The use of wood fired braziers inside the plant to be 
banned. 
2. All existing, and future, employees to be warned of 
the  possible  hazards  and  dangers  of  mis-using 
plant and machinery. 
3. Management to investigate the existing system of 
local heating in the plant with a view to improved 
supply and control of gas. If this is not feasible the 
possibility of a more efficient heating system to be 
examined. 
3. Rail 
A  shunter's  foot  was  injured  when  it was  crushed 
against a stack of ingots alongside the railtrack as he 
was riding on a diesel locomotive travelling through a 
Melting Shop. 
The 'Janus' type locomotive involved had crew refuge 
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steps at each of its four corners. The steps which gave 
access and  egress to and  from the  locomotive con-
sisted of four treads. The  refuge was 1ft 7 1/2" wide 
and  11  1/2"  deep.  At  the  time of the  accident the 
locomotive was  being  driven  out of a  Melting Shop 
with the shunter standing in a front refuge. As it roun-
ded a curve the leading edge of the locomotive struck 
a stack of ingots which had been  placed 2ft 2" from 
the track. It was at this time that the shunter's foot 
was injured. 
During investigations after the accident it was estab-
lished that the stacking of materials used in the melt-
ing shop in close proximity to rail tracks sometimes 
caused  obstruction and,  in  addition,  rubbish  under-
foot could create further hazards for shunters. 
During the enquiry it was also agreed that whilst trav-
elling through certain areas of the Melting Shop the 
cab  of the  locomotive offered  better protection  for 
shunters than the refuge. 
Recommendations 
1. Melting Shop supervisory staff have been  formally 
instructed not to stack materials within a 4 ft mar-
gin of the rail track. 
2. Rubbish  alongside  rail  tracks  within  the  Melting 
Shop  is  to  be  regularly  removed  by  mechanical 
means. 
4. Carbon monoxide poisoning 
Because of the loss of a water seal blast furnace gas 
leaked to atmosphere and 15 contractors' employees 
working  in  the vicinity were affected, in  varying  de-
grees, by carbon monoxide poisoning. 
The leakage occurred from an 8" diameter drain valve 
leading to a 'U' seal drain. The valve was attached to a 
water seal on a 96" diameter Blast Furnace gas main 
(see sketch). The contractors-pipe fitters, electricians, 
a welder, a storeman and a foreman, were working in 
the vicinity of an open Circuit Pump House and Con-
tractors' Compound approximately 55 yards from the 
water seal.  During  the morning, a fitter's mate who 
had  been  engaged on  aligning pumps,  collapsed  in 
the  Contractors' Compound.  Approximately  15  min-
utes later an  electrician collapsed and other person-
nel were taken ill at the open circuit pump house. The 
work's surgery was informed of both incidents and 15 
persons were treated for carbon monoxide poisoning. 
Examination of the installation showed that the gas 
leakage had  resulted  from the corrosion and  subse-
quent holing of the drain seal  pipework and  conse-
quential loss of the water seal. The corrosion had not 
been  detected because of the lagging enclosing the 
pipework. The lagging was made of polystyrene and it 
Is possible that this would tend to prevent any water 
escaping and increase the risk of corrosion of the pipe-
work. Weather conditions at the time, mist with very 
little breeze, were not conducive to gas dispersal. 
The Security Department had been aware of the loca-
tion of all contracting firms involved and were in pos-
session of a  location diagram. The  Medical  Depart-
ment had  not been  aware of the site location of the 
Contractors. During investigations after the accident 
it became apparent that contractors' personnel were 
not aware of the symptoms of carbon monoxide poi-soning and therefore did not realize that they were be-
ing affected by gas. 
Recommendations 
1. The lagging on  the drain seals and  inlet and over-
flow water pipework on  all 26 main water seals on 
the  plant will be  removed.  The  exposed  pipework 
will be examined and repaired or replaced as neces-
sary. 
2. Specialist advice will be  sought on corrosion pro-
tection for this pipework and the desirability of fu-
ture  re-lagging.  If  re-lagging  is  recommended,  a 
suitable frequency for pipework examination will be 
determined from this source. 
3. Contractors' personnel  to be  instructed as  to the 
possible effects of carbon monoxide poisoning. 
4. The medical department must be advised of the site 
locations of contractors. 
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1. Water seal overflow 
2. 96" in. dia. blast furnace gas main 
3. Water inlet 
4. 8" dia. drain seal lagged with polystyrene 
5. Holes in pipework 
6. Drain to soakaway 
5. Accidental tilting of an electric 
arc furnace 
Whilst preparations were being made to tap an  elec-
tric arc furnace 80 tons of molten metal were lost be-
cause of the accidental operation of the furnace tilt le-
ver. Considerable damage was caused to surrounding 
installations but no personnel were injured. 
The  furnace metal car was being brought to the fur· 
nace tapping position prior to tapping. The  controls 
for this equipment are located in a tapping pulpit on 
the launder side of the furnace and  included on  the 
control desk is an  operating facility for the tilting of 
the furnace. Operation by  lever control can give fast 
operation  or slow,  together  with  inch  selection  by 
means of push, bottom control. On the day of the inci-
dent the operator accepted  control  of the steel  car 
from the casting bay personnel and by operating con-
trols in the tapping pulpit proceeded to bring the car 
into the furnace position ambush. At this time, the fur-
nace tilted into the slagging position so that 80 tons 
of liquid steel was discharged onto the stage and into 
the cellar levels of the furnace. Damage was caused 
to the furnace stage support beam,  removable stage 
section,  pulpit door,  power cables  and  other equip-
ment in the vicinity. Emergency procedures as laid out 
in the local site disaster plan were activated, key per-
sonnel were called out but it was not necessary to fully 
implement the plan. 
Checks were made on the electrical control for the tilt 
operation of the furnace and these were found to be in 
good  working  order.  The  operator stated that at no 
time did he purposely operate the furnace tilt control 
mechanism. It can  only be assumed that his protec-
tive molten metal jacket had caught the tilt operating 
control and moved it to the slagging position whilst he 
was observing the movement of the metal car. 
Recommendations 
1. A manually actuated interlocking gate to be  fitted 
to the tilt motion with the aim of preventing a reoc-
currence. 
2. Electrical engineers to examine the possibility of 
modifying the electrical circuits of the furnace to al-
low it to tilt for tapping and  return  to the neutral 
position only (as operated from the tapping pulpit). 
The possibility of providing a master control switch 
for  furnace  tilt  control  is  to  be  examined.  This 
switch would be situated in the main furnace pulpit 
and  would  produce  the  possibility  of  selecting 
which pulpit had control of the tilt. The furnace tilt 
control is to remain the same as for operation from 
the furnace control pulpit. 
3. Other furnaces in the Melting Shop to be examined 
for potential risk factors and possible modifications 
as previously quoted. 
4. Procedure for implementing call-out of key person-
nel to be reviewed and tightened. 
6. Leakage of blast furnace gas 
into a steam circuit 
Two  blast furnace fitters were  replacing  a defective 
steam valve at the outlet from the boilers. As steam-
was leaking from one of the flanges, the two fitters, af-
ter consulting their superiors, closed the main valves 
on the boilers and also closed the other cut-off valves 
and  released  the pressure in  the steam circuit. They 
then dismantled the valve, returned to the workshop 
to clean the bolts by which it was held in place and to 
prepare new seals, and then went back to replace the 
valve, at which point they began to feel ill. It was obvi-
ous that their condition was due to gas. An investiga-
tion and examination of the steam circuit gave rise to 
the  suspicion  that some  blast furnace  gas  had  es-
caped through the shut-off valve of one of the blast 
furnace gas washers.  In  spite of the high number of 
valves  included in this circuit, it turned out that the 
blast  furnace  gas  had  managed  to  reach  the  spot 
where  the defective valve  had  been  dismantled, fol-
lowing a somewhat complicated path in the steam cir-
cuit of about 150 metres, which explains the time that 
elapsed before the workmen were affected by it. 
The accident was due to two simultaneous events: 
(I)  the decompression of the steam circuit to atmos-
pheric pressure; 
(II)  leakage of gas from a defective valve on one of the 
washers. 
3 Preventive measures: 
(i)  replacing the valve on the washer; 
(ii)  installing two cut-off valves with an  intermediate 
venting valve on the main steam distribution pipe; 
(iii) revision of existing instructions. 
7. Circular saw blade falls onto fitter 
A  circular  blade,  weighing  approximately  600  kg, 
which had been removed from a fixed saw in a mill fell 
onto a fitter, who had been assisting in the operation, 
inflicting severe injuries. 
The accident occurred in a Medium Section Mill whilst 
the blade on a fixed saw was being changed. The old 
blade had been removed from the saw with the aid of a 
purpose  made  lifting device (porter bar)  suspended 
from  an  EOT  crane. The crane had then transported 
the blade to a storage area. 
The blade was positioned over a stillage, on which it 
was to be  stored, and then lowered into its channel 
base. The crane was then cross travelled in order to 
ensure that the blade was on  the centre line of the 
blade park position. Whilst the crane was carrying out 
this manoeuvre the blade tilted towards the fitter, who 
was standing to one side of it, and during the tilting 
motion a securing device on  the porter bar became 
disengaged  and  allowed the  blade to fall  against a 
handrail. It then slid down the lower part of the fitter's 
body causing serious injuries. 
Examination of the site after the accident showed that 
the stillage had been slightly slewed out of the line of 
the mill. This would have made the approach for the 
crane driver more difficult than had the stillage been 
at 90° to the line of  the mill. The fitter, watching the low-
ering operation, realized that the blade was not lined 
up correctly and had raised his hand to stop the crane. 
None the less, it is probable that the blade came into 
contact with one of the bottom wedge blocks. Tests 
carried out afterwards showed that the effect of the 
blade coming into contact with the wedge results in a 
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slack rope condition which could change the centre of 
gravity of the load and cause the blade to tilt forward. 
Tests also revealed that under certain circumstances 
it was possible for the porter bar to fall out. 
Recommendations 
1. Ensure that stillages are placed at 90° to the roller 
tables, ensuring that the crane has only to execute 
long travel, or cross travel  movements in  order to 
land blades. The area is to be surveyed with a view 
to marking it with white lines to indicate the best 
position for the stillage. 
2. Instructions to be issued that porter bars are to be 
subjected  to  stringent  inspections  on  a  routine 
·basis. If bars and pins are found to be bent they are 
to be sent to the blacksmiths for straightening. 
3. Ensure that the blade is centrally positioned, mid-
way between the chocks on the channel, during low-
ering from EOT cranes. 
An additional plate to be fitted to the stillages as a 
guide to ensure that the blade is directed into the 
channel at the bottom. 
4. The lifting lugs must be positioned entirely through 
the saw-blades hub at all times before and during 
transportation of the assembly. 
5. The porter bar to be redesigned to ensure that once 
the  blade  is attached onto the pins  it cannot  be-
come free  under any circumstances. Modification 
to be carried out through the Crane Design Depart-
ment. 
8. Ignition of Benzene vapours by static 
electricity 
A chemist suffered an accident while filtering hot ben-
zene under an extractor hood. Just as he was complet-
ing this task, static electricity generated a spark be-
tween the chemist's hand and the metal funnel he was 
using. This spark ignited the vapours and resulted in 
burns to the victim's hands. Action 
(i)  earthing of metal funnels; 
(ii)  wearing of antistatic shoes; 
(iii) antistatic floor covering  in  front of the extractor 
hood. 
9. Fall from a height of 9 metres 
A crane driver in a steelworks had transported a cast-
ing  ladle  to the repair shop  for stripping of the  re-
fractory lining. The  stripping operation took rather a 
long time, so he left his crane and, in order not to have 
to take the 60 metres long regulation track gangway to 
descend, he climbed down a ladder from it onto the re-
pair gangway below.  He  climbed over the railing of 
this gangway to get down onto the railing of the 9 m 
platform, and in doing so lost his hold and fell 9 me-
tres onto the shop floor, where he died of his injuries. 
The cause of this tragic accident was that the crane 
driver took a short cut  in  the  form  of the  'climbing 
operation' described above, instead of taking the com-
pletely safe descending stairway at the end of the reg-
ulation track gangway. 
Action: 
All possible short-cuts were fenced off. 
! 
Track 
gangway 
Repair 
gangway 
Seclion.A·A 
V/?7/7 ;;  /)  /77JJ7] 
10. Coking plant - conveyor belt 
Four workers were busy cleaning the return drum of 
an  inclined conveyor belt, jammed by  an  accumula-
tion of coke. The belt drive is equipped with an auto-
matic anti-reverse system.  When  the drum jammed, 
the belt was stretched upstream and downstream of 
the tensioning unit mainly due to several attempts to 
start up the belt whilst workers were trying to release 
the jammed drum. At the moment when the victim and 
his colleague succeeded  in  releasing  the drum, the 
tension of the belt and the weight of the material on it 
caused it to slacken, sag and turn the drum sharply. 
The left arm and torso of the victim, who was scraping 
the drum, were caught. Death was instantaneous. 
Action 
(i)  The management decided to contact the suppliers 
to find out if there was any means of equipping the 
conveyor belt with a caliper brake and  possibly a 
coupling allowing the anti-reverse system to be dis-
engaged if necessary. 
(ii) Certain instructions have been tightened up. Hence-
forth  if  any  work  necessitates  removal  of  the 
guards, it must be  authorized by the foreman and 
carried out by skilled personnel. 
11. Electrician falls from an EOT crane 
Two  electricians  were  carrying  out  routine  mainte-
nance work on  No 3 10 tonne EOT crane in the scrap 
bay. In order to carry out tests after completion of the 
work, one of them  entered  the crane  control cabin. 
The other electrician observed that the braking of the 
translation  movement was  too violent.  He  therefore 
set about adjusting the brake, steadying himself, on 
the platform alongside the travelling cross shaft, on 
one of the two beams in the middle of the crane. He 
adopted a semi-kneeling stance in order to adjust the 
compression of the brake during crane travel. 
As  the crane was returning towards the end-of-travel 
buffers the first electrician saw that the brake was not 
responding and attempted to reverse the travel move-
ment. Despite this precaution, the gantry struck the 
buffers. 
Unbalanced by the impact, the second electrician fell 
approximately 13 metres onto a pile of scrap. 
Consequences of the accident: multiple bruising, one 
fractured rib, fracture of the left index finger, injury to 
the left leg. 
The  inquiry  into the  accident did  not establish  the 
cause of brake failure. Be that as it might, the reversal 
manoeuvre which should have stopped the crane was 
undertaken too close to the buffers. 
In  view of the risk of fall faced by operatives during 
certain tasks on  overhead  cranes,  particularly while 
the crane is moving, a safety harness should hence-
forth be worn.  However, the problems involved in the 
introduction of this measure have yet to be studied. 
Action taken: setting up of a working party to estab-
lish appropriate safety measures. 
12. Men severely burned at a steelworks 
A shift foreman and three titters were on the 19.6 m. 
platform above the converter of a BOP shop, engaged 
on repairs to a continuous conveyor. The men began 
their work  whilst  the  converter  was  being  charged 
with  15  t.  scrap  and  0.8  t.  molybdenum  oxide.  The 
charging box was then moved to the side and pouring 
of the pig iron began. As  there was trouble with the 
tilting of the pig iron ladle (skull formation), this pro-
cess had to be suspended after 12.1 t. of pig had been 
charged. To rectify the fault, the ladle was withdrawn 
and the converter tilted towards its original position. 
Immediately after the converter had reached the verti-
cal, an  unusually large quantity of carbon monoxide 
emerged from the mouth and caught fire. The flames 
were not completely trapped by the hood but escaped 
between it and the converter. They reached the work-
ing platform at 19.6 m on which three of the four men 
were  busy with repairs.  These  men  received  severe 
burns and despite immediate first aid measures, died. 
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The  investigation of the  accident  revealed  that  the 
carbon in the pig iron reacted spontaneously with the 
oxygen of the molybdenum oxide when the converter 
was tilted back to the vertical. The quantity of carbon 
monoxide formed by  this very rapid reaction was so 
great that the hood was not able to trap all of it. 
In order to prevent such accidents in the future, it was 
forbidden for men to be above the mouth during con-
verter operation. 
The  danger zones were determined for every part of 
the converter by means of a hazards survey analysis. 
In  addition, it became a formal requirement that the 
system of 'free-for-operation certificates', introduced 
some time previously, be respected to the letter. A fur-
ther finding from the investigation was that molybde-
num oxide should be distributed over the scrap charg-
ing box so that it is also well distributed in the convert-
er. 
13. Fatal accident caused by a reversing 
wheel loader 
During the first shift, a wheel loader was transporting 
scrap from the rolling shop to the stockpile. An  un-
skilled workman was helping the driver of the vehicle 
at the stockpile to remove any scrap remaining in the 
shovel. 
When  the  load  had  been  discharged,  the  unskilled 
worker indicated to the driver of the wheel loader that 
he should reverse to carry out an operation at the re-
quest of a foreman from another department. He then 
went ahead, turning his back on the vehicle. The driver 
reversed and ran him over. 
Action: 
Loaders  are  now  equipped  with  acoustic  signals 
which function when reverse gear is engaged. 
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14. Killed while trying to hook up 
a moving railway wagon 
A locomotive had pushed two wagons loaded with bil-
lets onto a dead-end track. Thinking they were travel-
ling too fast, the shunters tried to hook the wagons up 
to the locomotive to stop them. One of the men took 
up a position between the first wagon and the locomo-
tive.  He  stumbled,  fell  and  was  crushed  by the rail 
guard of the locomotive althou!1Jh  it stopped almost 
immediately. 
This accident was mainly due to safety rules not being 
observed. 
A decision was made to: 
(i)  remind personnel of safety rules; 
(ii) pay particular attention to training of shunters. 
15. CO-poisoning during maintenance of 
the gas cleaning plant of an oxygen 
steel shop 
During downtime on  No 1 converter, a six-man team 
was finishing up  after test runs of the gas cleaning 
plant. Two men were engaged in closing the explosion 
doors of the  washer and  the  waste gas  stack,  two 
others were carrying out repairs on the grate at the 
bottom of the washer and the remaining two were in-
stalling spray nozzles in the fume extraction duct. 
At around 0.15, the four men working inside the instal-
lation were caught by a sudden arrival of carbon mo-
noxide and  slightly intoxicated. The  foreman  identi-
fied the hazard, ordered his fellow workers to leave im-
mediately and raised the alarm. 
As soon as the fire brigade arrived, they took samples 
of air in the fume extraction duct; the reading was 280 
p.p.m. of CO.  Another reading taken two hours later 
during blowing of the No 2 converter gave 3000 p.p.m. 
A third sample taken outside the blowing period of No 
2 converter gave 300 p.p.m. 
The gas originated from the sludge sewer (common to 
the  gas  cleaning  plants  of  both  converters)  - al-
though the extractiol'). fan of No 2 converter was run-
ning- as the isolation valves to the sludge sewer had 
been left open. 
The  work carried out by  the company is sub-divided 
into three phases: 
1. cleaning, 
2. rinsing (or test run of the gas cleaning plant), 
3. installation of the spray nozzles. 
The  fume extraction system must be  shut down be-
fore cleaning is carried out, i.e. spraying pumps and 
fume  extraction  fan  switched  off and  the  isolation 
valves to the sludge sewer closed. 
Rinsing has to be done with the installation running, 
i.e.  explosion doors closed, fan and spraying pumps 
switched on and isolation valves to the sludge sewer 
opened (to prevent water rising inside the washer). 
The  third operation, requiring  personnel to enter the 
cleaning plant again, calls for closing down the instal-
lation as when the converter is shut down. On the day of the accident, the safety regulations ap-
plicable to the task (shut down) were not observed for 
the third operation mentioned above, for the isolation 
valves to the sludge sewer had not been closed. 
Action: 
(i)  Stressing to supervisory staff of the importance of 
the safety regulations applicable to this task. 
---CD 
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1. Washer (secondary cleaning) 
2. Flare 
3. Stack 
4. Fan 
5. Sludge sewer shared by both installations 
6. Valve 
7. Grate 
(ii)  Reminder to the workers concerned of these regu-
lations. 
(iii) Check in situ on the sound application of the shut-
down procedure. 
16. Mechanic sustains serious burns 
while working on a blast furnace 
platform 
A maintenance mechanic was working as a greaser on 
blast furnace No 3.  One hour after casting, just after 
greasing  the  taphole  drill,  he  changed  position  to 
grease the clay g1.,1n. 
While stepping overthemain trough, his  leftfootslipped 
to the bottom of the runner in a place which still con-
tained a little molten pig iron. 
Assistance arrived immediately (the flames were  ex-
tinguished,  the  victim's shoe  removed  and  his foot 
wrapped  in  an  isothermic blanket)  but  nevertheless 
the mechanic sustained third degree burns to the left 
foot. 
N.  B.  The  maintenance  man  in  question  had  been 
working as a replacement for the usual greaser for a 
week before the accident. 
Action: 
(i)  Study the  installation of water outlets for emer-
gency spraying of burns. 
(ii)  Training by supervisory staff of the blast furnace 
shop of maintenance workers along with blast fur-
nace operatives. 
(iii) Analysis  of the  working  procedure:  ensure  that 
workers  concerned  do  not have  to step over the 
runner in order to grease the drill. 
SLUMBER  McBLUNDER 
·7 Basic principles of making safety an integral part of the 
running of the enterprise 
- The role of Management 
- Training of Management Staff and first-line Supervisors 
The following text has been prepared by the working parties 'Accident Prevention Organization' and 
'Safety-Training' of the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission and adopted by this Commission 
on 9 July 1983. 
1. Introduction 
The right to live free is recognized by all the countries 
of the Community. It includes the right to a safe and 
healthy environment. Therefor~ the protection of per-
sons is a major task of society. 
A corollary to this is that in all countries of the Com-
munity the employer has a duty to ensure that his em-
ployees remain  in  good health, and to protect them 
from accidents at work. 
However, this duty is exercised within the wider con-
text  of  society,  which  through  the  governmental 
bodies,  has  laid  down  obligations  in  the  form  of 
Health and Safety legislation. 
It is  the  Steel  Industry Safety and  Health  Commis-
sion's view that mere compliance with statutory ob-
ligations  is  not  enough  to  ensure  optimum  safety 
since there are and always will be preventive measures 
to be  taken even  if they are not compulsory, for ex-
ample those relating to working conditions specific to 
the enterprise. 
It would not be in the employer's and workers' interest 
If, owing to insufficient initiative on the part of firms, 
governments  were  obliged  to  take  legislation  on 
Health and Safety at work to excess. 
In addition, since the behaviour of each individual is 
influenced by the importance attached to Health and 
Safety1  by  society,  the  higher the  priority  given  to 
Health  and  Safety  in  society's  scale  of values  the 
easier it will be  for heads of enterprises to achieve 
their objectives of 'Health and Safety at work'. In this 
context, any initiatives likely to improve safety should 
be introduced, encouraged or developed, for example: 
(i)  at school -starting at primary school -children 
should be taught to follow safety practices and to 
realize that accidents are  due to human error or 
mechanical agencies and can therefore be avoided; 
(II)  technical schools and universities should give an 
appropriate place to accident prevention at work 
to their study and training courses, whatever the 
qualifications these lead to; 
(iii) enterprises should be encouraged to invest with a 
view to increasing industrial safety and  be  given 
tax concessions on such investment. 
'The term 'Health and Safety' must be understood to mean all forms 
of accident prevention and health protection, whether It be In a pro-
fessional context or In private life. 
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2. Integration of health and safety 
Making health and safety an  integral part of the run-
ning of the enterprise means that all measures to pre-
vent accidents at work should form part of the enter-
prise's normal activities. This means, in turn, that: 
(i)  all production or ancillary processes should incor-
porate measures which are conducive to avoiding 
accidents at  work,  injuries, damage to health or 
other factors detrimental to the wellbeing of em-
ployees; 
(ii)  supervisory staff in charge of a unit should be  re-
sponsible for accident prevention in the unit; 
(iii) all personnel doing jobs which could affect safety 
at work should be constantly aware of this fact; 
(iv) employees  can  work  without  being  unduly  ex-
posed to hazards or creating them; 
(v)  such hazards can be eliminated or controlled from 
installations and equipment at the design stage. 
Making  health  and  safety  an  integral  part  of work 
means putting into practice the well-established prin-
ciple that safety is everybody's business. It is also ap-
plying the principles of accident prevention which the 
Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission adopted 
in 1966 and especially the following, viz: 
3. Safety and  hygiene  measures  must  be  incorpo-
rated in production operations in such a way that 
they become inseparable. The way this is carried 
out must  be  clearly defined  for all  departments 
and at all levels. 
4. In the matter of accident prevention measures, it is 
essential  that the  management of an  enterprise 
and its various departments should be able to call 
on the advice of a special safety department under 
the management's direct authority, although the 
management must retain ultimate responsibility in 
this field. (This principle may need to be modified 
in smaller firms which do not have a safety depart-
ment.) 
5. All members of the hierarchy, whatever their posi-
tion, are responsible for accidel)t prevention in the 
sector for which they hold responsibility and must 
account to their superiors for their activities in this 
field.  Consequently,  in  assessing  personnel  this 
entails attaching the same importance to qualities 
relating to accident prevention as to other quali-
ties. 
6. All accident prevention activities must be  coordi-
nated within an overall programme, which must be 
punctuated  by  periodic  reports  indicating  prog-
ress made and enabling it to be kept constantly  un-
der review. 7. It would be appropriate that the opinion of the work· 
ers' representatives on  this programme should be 
invited as their cooperation in every sphere of acci-
dent prevention is of the greatest importance. 
10. Alongside  the  technical  and  organizational  as-
pects  of accident  prevention,  training  in  safety 
matters at all  levels of management and  for all 
workers  employed  is of the  highest  importance. 
With this aim in view, the trend must be towards 
safety training becoming an  integral part of voca-
tional training, but insofar as it may not be  pos-
sible to achieve this, the firm's programme should 
include additional training in this field. 
But to make health and safety an integral part of run-
ning the enterprise it is essential for senior manage-
ment  to be  conscious of their role  and  to  take  the 
most appropriate measures to attain this objective. 
To provide better information for the enterprise and in 
particular for its managers, the Steel Industry Safety 
and Health Commission instructed its Working Party 
on  the Organization of Accident Prevention to study 
this  problem and report back. The conclusions are given 
below. 
3. Role of management 
Safety at work
1 must be a prominent and essential ob· 
jective of the firm, just as important as profitability, 
production  or the quality of the manufactured  pro-
duct. The manager must make sure that this attitude 
is clear to each worker, whatever his level or role. 
In  order to integrate health and safeti into the run-
ning of the enterprise an employer who lays down the 
administrative and management duties and powers of 
managerial  staff in  a specific area  of responsibility 
must at the same time stipulate their duties and pow-
ers  in  respect  of health  and  safety matters for the 
same area. 
The  same should  be  done with members of certain 
functional services, such as the maintenance depart-
ment, planning department or the purchasing depart-
ment,  whose  activities  can  influence  the  safety  of 
workers in the operational sectors, or help to ensure 
same. 
The  way to make safety an  integral part of the oper-
ational process of the firm is therefore to include it in 
the establishment of managers' duties and  powers. 
These  should  make  it  clear  what  concrete  steps 
should be taken as part of the day-to-day activities, in-
cluding health and safety, and in particular indicate: 
(i)  the kind of decisions which may be taken, 
(ii)  the area of competence, 
(iii) the size of the group of workers over whom author-
ity is exercised, 
(iv) the  period  during  which  authority may  be  exer-
cised, 
(v)  any restriction of the decision-making power.2 
However, to make health and safety an integral part of 
work, it is also necessary that those in positions of re-
1 The expression 'health and safety' must be understood in its widest 
sense,  that Is  Including hygiene,  ergonomics,  occupational  med1· 
cine and working conditions. 
sponsibility at all levels have adequate knowledge in 
keeping  with  the  functions exercised  or the powers 
delegated and, morever, that they be advised or con-
sulted by the functional services such as the depart-
ment of safety and occupational medicine. This is all 
the more necessary since non-performance of an  ob-
ligation in the area of occupational safety could vio-
late the objectives of the enterprise and be considered 
a  serious  professional  shortcoming  in  the  light  of 
these objectives. 
Furthermore, when a decision is taken which may en-
tail a risk for employees, it is up to those in positions 
of responsibility to point this out to the department in 
which the decision originated. 
It is the task of management to coordinate activities 
common to various sectors of the enterprise or which 
overlap between sectors. 
The fact that health and safety tasks are delegated to 
all members of the managerial staff and to some per-
sons in other departments and that activities common 
to various sectors are  organized at the highest level 
does not release the head of the enterprise from  his 
overall responsibility for health and safety, in particu-
lar the obligation to monitor the proper performance 
of the tasks which he delegates, whether these relate 
to health and safety or to other objectives of the firm. 
In order to ensure that making health and safety an in-
tegral part of the firm's operation actually leads to im-
proved  health  and  safety it is  not sufficient for the 
head of the enterprise to define tunct  ions, delegate rel-
evant powers or ensure that those in positions of re-
sponsibility undergo the appropriate training, he must 
also act with  dynamism  and  perseverance,  and  be· 
lieve that the final objective is to convince all the em-
ployees, at whatever level, that safety is really and truly 
an objective of the firm and that every effort is being 
made to attain this objective. 
4. Training of manager staff and first 
line supervisors 
The  General  Commission  considers  well-informed 
management staff and  supervisors to be one of the 
most important prerequisites for the integration of in-
dustrial  safety with the other activities of an  enter-
prise,  and  directors  should  therefore organize  their 
training.  The  Working  Party on  Safety Training  has 
considered  this  problem,  and  its  conclusions  are 
given below. 
The  problem  of  providing  supervisors,  1  especially 
junior supervisors,  with adequate training to tackle 
competently  in  conjunction with their subordinates 
the various aspects of safety at work can no longer be 
considered in isolation, as was frequently the case in 
the past, but must today be seen in the context of su-
pervisor/worker relations. 
2 Decision-making powers may be restricted, for example by: 
- laws, regulations, agreements between  workers and  employers, 
etc; 
-considerations of a higher order at  policy level (e.g  purchasmg 
policy,  existing contracts and  rules,  budgetary considerations, 
etc.), 
- the  special  responsibilities of other sections of the  enterprise 
(obligations with respect to consultation, workers' rights to repre· 
sentation, etc). 
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changes  which  are  making  themselves  felt  in  the 
world  of today have also affected the relationships 
between people, sometimes radically modifying tradi-
tional patterns. 
In the company the position of the supervisor has also 
changed. While he continues to provide a command 
role,  and  thus  represent  management  to  his work-
force, he also feels he is a member of a group of su-
pervisors at the same level, and, together with his sub-
ordinates forms a more unified group. 
Any safety measures the supervisor has to introduce 
with regard to the workers under him must therefore 
be based on mutual consent on the one hand, and on 
an  understanding of the desiderata of the personnel 
on the other. Since this is the case, his safety training 
must cover inter alia: 
(i)  the problem of the coexistence in the same work-
ing area of young and senior workers and the re· 
suiting differences in behavioural patterns; 
(ii)  the changing circumstances, to which the supervi-
sor must continually adjust his own attitude; 
(iii) the need for constant updating of educational and 
technical  knowledge particularly with respect to 
problems  of  working  environment  and  occupa-
tional health and safety. 
Furthermore,  consideration  must  be  given  to  what 
workers  expect  of their supervisors,  and  as  far  as 
safety and health are concerned: 
(i)  to be able to organize the work in such a way that 
limits risks as much as possible; 
(ii)  to inform them of the special nature of any resid· 
ual hazards and the way to avoid, obviate or con· 
trol them; 
(Iii) to enable him to cooperate, either with individuals 
or a group, and evaluate his suggestions and ideas 
for improving occupational safety and health. 
Hence the guidelines for the training of supervisors in 
safety environmental  and  industrial  hygiene  should 
be based on these principles. 
Among the main guidelines for this are: 
(a) supplying the necessary information for an  under· 
standing of all aspects of work safety for which the 
supervisor is responsible; 
(b) encouraging in supervisors an attitude leading them 
to delegate tasks and to encourage and coordinate 
the work of their subordinates so that the relation· 
ship between supervisor and subordinate is based 
on  their  respective  skills and  safety  becomes  a 
shared activity; 
(c) render the supervisor aware of the importance of 
messages to and from subordinates so that he is 
informed at all times of abnormal situations arising 
In the sector entrusted to him being able to remedy 
the situation in good time; moreover he should be 
aware of the  need  for creating conditions which 
enable each and every one to express themselves 
freely. Such an open dialogue can only confirm his 
authority. 
1 The term 'supervisor' used In  this document refers to a member of 
the managerial staff, foreman, acting foreman chargehand, or lead· 
lng hand In his capacity as a person with responsibility at any level. 
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First line supervisors play a key  role in  maintaining 
health and safety standards as indeed they do in the 
other fields for which they are responsible. They have 
practical first-hand experience of things and are thus 
able to observe the difference between the real world 
and theoretical postulates in matters of technique, or-
ganization and behaviour more easily and more quickly 
than their superiors; they are also capable of taking 
the  initiative  themselves  to  deal  with  these  differ· 
ences and give the orders appropriate to the situation. 
In the opinion of the Steel Industry Safety and Health 
Commission,  the training of management staff and 
first-line supervisors in safety and health at the place 
of work should be  included in  the enterprise's acci· 
dent prevention programme2  and therefore, like other 
·preventive measures, be prepared, carried out and as· 
sessed in collaboration with the workers' representa· 
tives. 
But although the basic principle that all members of 
management staff and first-line supervisors must have. 
received  adequate  and  satisfactory  training  for  all 
their duties is an integral part of proper accident pre-
vention policy, the individual needs which have to be 
met vary considerably depending on  his level  of re· 
sponsibility and even  his specialization (allowing for 
varying job experience, length of service in the works, 
previous vocational and school training, etc). 
The problem facing the enterprise is to plan its acci· 
dent  prevention  programme  to  include  courses  of 
training  or  more  often  back-up  training  which  are 
suited to the individual needs of existing management 
staff and first-line supervisors or of persons, who are 
about  to  become  such.  These  courses  of  training 
should preferably form part of more general job train· 
ing so that safety is seen as an integral part of the job 
and not as an afterthought. 
The SISHC and  its Working Party on  Safety-Training 
feel that because of the similarity in the duties of man-
agement staff and first-line supervisors in the steel in-
dustry throughout the Community, a relatively harmo-
nized training plan would not only encourage safety, 
but may also facilitate the free movement of workers 
in the future. For this reason the SISHC is suggesting 
which subjects it would like to see adopted by enter-
prises in their safety training programme tor this staff. 
Each enterprise should decide, depending on the ex-
act nature of their employees' duties, to what degree 
of detail these subjects should be covered. 
Refresher and updating courses should be organized 
at regular intervals. 
In most countries in the Community, there are possibil-
ities for training outside the enterprise; these may be 
public or private teaching establishments, bodies or 
departments of bodies set up by employers' or work-
ers' professional organizations, regional or local busi-
ness  associations,  state  or  private  compensation 
schemes, organizations for the promotion of safety, 
etc. 
It is up to enterprise to seek the best possible training 
arrangements, taking account of the size and poten-
tial of both its own departments and of those of out-
'Please see document 'Accident Prevention Programme', 1977,  EUR 
5922, published by the Publications Office of the European Commu· 
nltles. ...... 
...... 
Subjects tor a training programme on safety for management and supervisory staff 
1. Importance-of accident prevention 
at the following levels 
2. Legal aspects 
3. Technical aspects of safety 
4. Methodological aspects 
5. Physiological and psychological 
aspects 
6. General aspects 
-human 
-social 
-economic 
- legislation - regulations 
- responsibility 
- rights and duties (also in dangerous situations) 
- obligations in the works- in~tructions 
-responsibility 
- general hazards (electricity, gas, fire, transport, etc) 
- specific hazards (installations, workplaces, working conditions) 
- accident prevention - elimination of hazards 
- protection - collective protection 
- personal protection 
- techniques- inspection 
- job analysis 
- training - of new recruits 
- of transferred staff 
- accident analysis 
-ergonomics 
- procedure for applying rules (fire permits, deposits, etc.) 
- communications between individuals and groups- with higher-grade staff 
- with equals 
- with lower-grade staff 
- health, hygiene and occupational disease risks 
-working conditions, assigning of staff 
-organization of safety - company policy 
- organization structures and cooperation 
- organization for cooperation with labour represetltatives 
- accident prevention programme 
- first-aid and rescue arrangements 
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- good order and cleanliness side organizations, so that all the management staff 
and  first-line supervisors receive practical and effec-
tive training. 
It is confirmed, in reference to the 10th principle of the 
SISHC - Accident Prevention, that any supervisory 
member of a firm whatever his rank or function must 
receive safety training tailored to meet the responsi-
bility conferred upon him. 
However, the success of any training measure will de-
pend upon the extent the trainees' superiors actively 
support the training programme. This causes the first 
management to be aware of the need for safety train· 
ing. Management can then pass down the managerial 
structure its commitment to such  training schemes 
thus favourably influencing them. 
5. Conclusion 
Making health and safety an integral part of the firm's 
operation leads to real, effective and continuous acci-
dent prevention. 
However, the Steel  Industry Safety and  Health Com-
mission points out that making health and safety an 
integral part of work will only bear full fruit if it forms 
part of a set  or organizational  measures within the 
firm. The SISHC has already prepared other studies, 
all of which merit the same attention as the present 
document, viz.: 
(i)  Principles of accident prevention. 
(ii)  Check questionnaire of the accident prevention or-
ganization within the enterprise. 
(iii) Accident prevention programme (EUR 5922). 
(iv) Training of industrial safety advisers (EUR 6091). 
(v)  Cooperation of workers and their representatives 
in accident prevention within the enterprise. 
(vi) General considerations in the training of workers' 
safety representatives  in safety and  health mat-
ters. 
The Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission ear-
nestly hopes that an  increasing number of firms will 
rnake safety an integral part of their operation. Prop-
erly  applied  this will  undoubtedly lead  to improved 
health, safety and working conditions. 
Stamps and fire fighting 
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12 Gas boosters 
The following text has been prepared by the working party 'Safety-Gas Lines' of 
the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission and adopted by this Commission 
on 9 July 1982. 
Gas boosters for exhausting or boosting gas used in 
the steel industry present a risk of leaks, and  hence 
gas-poisoning and explosion, as a result of either inad-
equate sealing  or the rupture of the casing  for me-
chanical  reasons.  Furthermore, if not equipped with 
satisfactory safety devices, they may cause low-pres-
sure conditions upstream in the network, thus allow-
ing air to enter and form explosive mixture. 
These  various  risks as well  as  adequate preventive 
measures are studied below. 
1. Installation of boosters 
Boosters may  be  installed in  the open  air or inside 
rooms.  Whichever solution  is adopted,  the  location 
must be selected with due consideration for the risks 
mentioned above  and  to avoid any concentration of 
personnel, vital installations or intense traffic in  the 
vicinity. 
Booster rooms should be permanently ventilated, pro-
vided, with at  least two emergency exits and should 
serve  no other purpose (e.g.  as a workshop,  stores, 
etc.). 
Electrical installations for motive power or lighting in 
such rooms are in most cases subject to national reg-
ulations.  Where  no  official  provisions  exist,  such 
equipment must be of particularly safe design: flame-
proof motors, gas-tight electrical systems and equip-
ment. 
Each  gas booster must be equipped with an  in  situ 
emergency cut-out capable of bringing the  installa-
tion to an immediate standstill. All such cut-outs must 
be readily identifiable. 
A continuous automatic gas detection system must 
be installed in booster rooms to trigger an audible and 
visual alarm in a central control station at a distance 
from the booster, as well as audible and visual alarms 
inside the booster room and outside each entrance to 
it. Where boosters are provided with sound-proof en-
closures,  a detector should also be  installed inside 
the enclosure. 
A system should be  installed to draw off gas which 
may leak from the seals or stuffing boxes;  it should 
permit the injection of inert gas and the extraction of 
the leaking gas to a safe place outside. 
Boosters located in the open air must be installed in 
an enclosure surrounded by wire fencing, with at least 
two emergency exits. Entry to the enclosure should be 
restricted to authorized personnel. Notices should be 
posted forbidding entry to the enclosure and indicat-
ing the danger of gas in the vicinity. 
Operations involving the creating of sources of igni-
tion must not be allowed, either in booster rooms or 
within open-air enclosures containing boosters, with-
out special authorization by way of a 'fire permit' pro-
cedure, in which the fire-fighting procedure and prac-
tice are set out. 
It must be possible to isolate each booster separately 
from the network, following the procedure described 
in  the document 'Insulating and degassing lines' of 
the Steel Industry Safety and Health Commission. 
2. Risk of disintegration of a booster 
casing 
The  rupture of a booster casing for mechanical rea-
sons  will  cause  gas  to  escape  and  consequently 
create serious risks of poisoning and explosions. 
As  a result, there is a need to ensure that rupture is 
prevented and that the amount of gas escaping in the 
event of failure is limited. 
2.1. Prevention of casing rupture 
Prevention should take two forms: maintenance of the 
booster in a clean state and good working order, and 
the use of reliable automatic safety devices. 
The  contaminant  entering  the  machine  consists of 
dust contained in the gas which can form deposits on 
the impeller and create vibration. 
In order to prevent such deposits, certain types of gas 
boosters are equipped with a water injection system 
which begins to operate when the booster is switched 
on. In such cases, the water used must be sufficiently 
clean  and  of adequate  quality; it must  be  sprayed 
finely and drained off in a suitable manner. Moreover, 
the impeller of this type of booster must have a corro-
sionresistant coating if the material employed is not 
corrosion resistant. 
The impeller wheels of coke-oven gas boosters can be 
cleaned by injecting light oil at regular intervals. 
Where  boosters  are  not equipped  with an  injection 
system deposits must be  removed  from the impeller 
as frequently as necessary. 
With regard to good working, there would be periodic 
inspections to check the impeller for wear and cracks, 
as  well  as to ensure that the injection system func-
tions properly. 
Furthermore,  each  booster  must  be  equipped  with 
vibration  detectors  and  temperature  probes  which 
trigger individual alarms at the central control station 
as soon as their first respective operating thresholds 
are  reached.  When  a second  threshold,  higher than 
the first is reached, the machine must be switched off 
by the device. 
The materials used for these detectors and tempera-
ture measuring elements, as well, must be corrosion-
resistant. 
13 These safety systems must be highly reliable and, like 
the other systems recommended below, be subjected 
to regular tests to ensure correct operation. 
2.2. Restriction of the amount of gas escaping in the 
event of rupture 
In spite of the above recommendations, a mechanical 
fault may result in the fracture of a booster casing; in 
such cases, the amount of gas released must be kept 
to a minimum. 
For this purpose, a rapidly operating isolating device 
at the inlet of each booster must close automatically, 
as a result of a fall in pressure occurring downstream 
of the boosters when the casing is fractured and the 
pressure  is  measured  between  the  booster and  its 
downstream non-return gas valve. 
It should be noted that the rapid isolating device must 
also be  under the control of the central control sta-
tion. 
3. Risk of underpressure in the network 
Whatever the gas booster's position may be within a 
network (at a gas cleaning plant outlet or near the ser-
vice  outlets),  there  is  always  a  minimum  pressure 
level upstream of the booster beyond which pressure 
should not be allowed to fall in order to create a de-
pression and, therefore the possibility of air entering 
the network. 
Two  mm1mum  upstream  pressure  threshold  values 
must be defined for each booster. The first is the limit 
below which an  adjustment of the gas flow is neces-
sary. When the second limit, which is lower than the 
first is reached, the booster's motor must be stopped 
automatically. 
Highly reliable monitoring and safety equipment must 
be installed to meet these requirements. 
Moreover, in the event of failure of one or more of the 
boosters, or any other incident, a drop in pressure in 
the network downstream of the booster must be  pre-
vented by suitable means. 
4. Personnel training 
It is most important that the personnel who operate, 
check and maintain boosters should have received a 
broad  training on  the characteristics of the installa-
tions, the various risks that may be present within the 
existing safety systems, possible types of breakdown 
and  the  remedial  action for each  case.  In  addition, 
each of these persons must be equipped with a self-
contained face mask, have been instructed on how to 
wear it and have received the first aid training for spe-
cific risks mentioned in the document 'First aid and 
rescue' published by the Commission of the European 
Communities as part of its work on safety and health 
in the steel industry. 
Stamps and road safety 
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14 Readers' correspondence 
One of our readers has asked us to specify, preferably by means of examples, the manner In which Industrial 
accidents are recorded for the purposes of the annual Community survey which was recently modified, on Indus-
trial accidents In the steel industry. 
Changes made to the annual 
Community survey on industrial 
accidents in the steel industry 
The  Statistical Office of the  European Communities 
has made certain changes to the annual Community 
survey on industrial accidents in the steel industry in 
order to increase the usefulness of the statistics for 
accident prevention departments. The relevant SOEC 
working  party drew  up  and  approved  these  amend· 
ments in conjunction with the Directorate General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Education. 
The  main  methodological  changes  incorporated  as 
from 1 January 1983 (and therefore applicable to 1983 
statistics) are shown hereafter: 
1. Field of survey 
The survey henceforth covers accidents to all workers 
irrespective of whether or not they deal with products 
covered by the ECSC Treaty and working in one of the 
following technological departments: 
(i)  iron and steel coking plants, 
(ii)  blast furnaces, including burden preparation, 
(iii)  melting shops, 
(iv)  rolling mills, tinning, lead coating and galvaniz-
ing workshops, 
(v)  finishing  operations and  storage for rolled  pro-
ducts, 
(vi)  maintenance departments, 
(vii)  transport  departments.  This  includes  rail,  port 
and  road vehicles,  their installations and work-
shops, which are common to more than one de-
partment, 
(viii) other auxiliary departments, including any man-
ual  workers  who  could  not  be  classified  else-
where, 
(ix)  administration, including any non-manual  work-
ers who could not be classified elsewhere. 
2. Accidents 
The accidents to be  recorded are those which occur 
during the calendar year. They should be broken down 
into three categories: 
(i)  non-fatal  accidents  resulting  in  absence  from 
work of more than three calendar days excluding 
the day of the accident; 
(ii)  non-fatal accident  resulting  in  an  absence  from 
work of over 21 calendar days excluding the day of 
the accident; 
(iii) accidents resulting in the death of the victim with-
in 30 days of the accident. 
Examples: 
(i)  an  accident causing an  absence from work of 27 
calendar days is entered in the first and the sec-
ond categories above; 
(ii)  an  accident resulting in absence from work of 19 
calendar days is entered in the first category only; 
(iii) a fatal accident is entered only in the third cate-
gory, even  if the victim did not die until 15 or 25 
days after the accidents. 
3. Days lost 
The 'days lost' refers to the number of calendar days 
actually  lost through  accidents which  occur during 
the reference year, until the victim returns to work; the 
day of the accident itself is not counted. 
~ 
To  this  number  is  added,  according  to the  system 
used in your country, either: 
-the calendar days lost during the  reference  year 
through accidents which occurred in  the previous 
year (system A) 
or 
- the calendar days lost in the following year for ac-
cidents  which  occurred  in  the  reference  year 
(system B). 
The  two figures thus obtained are broken down  into 
two categories: 
- one category covers non-fatal accidents resulting 
in a total absence from work of over three days; 
- the other category covers  non-fatal  accidents re-
sulting in a total absence of over 21  days. 
Examples: 
- An  accident occurs in February, causing 32 calen-
dar days' stoppage (excluding the day of the acci-
dent). These 32  days are counted both in the cat-
egory of days lost through accidents involving ab-
sence from work of over three days and in that of 
accidents involving an absence of over 21  days. 
-An  accident occurs in January causing 15 calendar 
days'  absence  from  work.  These  15  days  are 
counted only in the category of days lost through 
accidents causing a minimum absence from work 
of 3 days. 
- An accident occurs on 21  December 1983 causing a 
stoppage of 40  days,  i.e.  10 days  in  1983  and  30 
days In 1984. It should first be noted that as the to-
tal stoppage is 40 calendar days the accident be-
longs both to the 'over 3 days' absence' category 
and to the 'at least 22 days' absence' category. 
The classification of the number of calendar days lost 
will, moreover, differ according to whether system A 
or system B is selected in the country where the plant 
In which the accident occurred is situated. 
Using system A, an absence from work of 10 days will 
be recorded and an absence of 30 days in the 1984 rec-
ords for each of the categories of length of absence 
(  > 3 days and  > 21  days). 
Using  system  B,  the  40  days'  stoppage  will  be  re-
corded in the two categories of seriousness for 1983 
only. 
4. Size-class of establishment 
All plants (establishments) should be classified in one 
of the following size-classes: 
(i)  less than 500 workers (irrespective of whether or 
not they deal with products covered by the ECSC 
Treaty); 
(li)  between 500-1  999 workers (ditto); 
(iii) 2 000 or more workers (ditto). 
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